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settings. Using a modern duality approach, this paper formally investigates dierences
occurring in industries with low skilled wage rigidity and, for the ﬁrst time in literature,
presents empirical evidence supporting the theoretical ﬁndings. Using a logit model to
analyze microeconomic German panel data, results show that International Outsourcing
signiﬁcantly increases low skilled unemployment when taking place in industries charac-
terized by low skilled wage rigidity. Thus, in terms of unemployment, not International
Outsourcing but inﬂexible labor market institutions instead should be blamed for harming
low skilled labor.
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11 Introduction
Withinthelastdecade, ahugeareaoftheoreticalaswellasempiricalliteratureemerged
investigating implications of International Outsourcing. Most of these contributions
assume ﬂexible wage economies. With respect to labor market rigidities, that typically
characterize major European economies, only few theoretical contributions emerged
recently. However, there is still a lack of empirical evidence. This manuscript tries to
contributetoﬁllthisgap. Therefore, itformallyanalyzestheimplicationsoflowskilled
wage rigidity on general equilibrium eects of International Outsourcing and provides
this ﬁelds ﬁrst empirical evidence: When industries are characterized by sticky wages
for low skilled labor, International Outsourcing increases the wage gap between low
and high skilled labor less extensively. This, however, has to be bought dearly with an
increase in low skilled unemployment.
Concerning labor market eects of International Outsourcing in a ﬂexible wage
economies, Feenstra and Hanson (1996a,b) very early show that International Out-
sourcing increases the relative wage of high skilled labor on a more aggregated indus-
try level in both, the insourcing (developing) as well as the outsourcing (developed)
economy. Within a series of papers, Arndt (1997, 1998a,b) investigates general equilib-
rium eects of International Outsourcing at more disaggregated industry levels. Since
producers shed their less competitive production blocks to become more ecient com-
petitors on world markets, International Outsourcing has dierent eects depending
on the relative skill intensity of the outsourcing industry. When taking place in the rel-
ative low skill intensive industry, International Outsourcing increases relative wages
of the low skilled, and decreases them when taking place in the relative high skill
intensive industry. Since the outsourcing industry gets more competitive on world
markets, it increases output while the other industry, the one remaining integrated,
contracts. Focusing on the implications on innovation, Glass and Saggi (2001) show
that International Outsourcing decreases relative wages but increases the pace of inno-
vation and therefore, accelerates the progression of the technology frontier. Deardor
(2001a,b) shows within a combination of a Ricardian and a Heckscher-Ohlin model,
that adjustment eects of International Outsourcing depend on the factor intensities
of the relocated production blocks. Egger and Falkinger (2003) focus on distributional
eects of International Outsourcing. Considering dierent modes of ﬁnal goods pro-
duction, they investigate factor price consequences of International Outsourcing in
several equilibrium situations. More recently, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)
present a simple paradigm investigating consequences of what they call “task-trade”
on prices, resource allocation, and welfare. Arguing in terms of factor augmenting
technical changes, a decline in the costs of task trade directly boosts the productivity
of the respective factor. Kohler (2008) presents a uniﬁed framework in order to explain
2the dierences of the factor vs. the sector bias of International Outsourcing. His re-
sults show that the implications depend strongly on the shock that induces oshore
sourcing (a reduction in factor costs of delocalization on the one hand or a change in
prices for the tradable ﬁnal good on the other hand). Thus, Kohler illuminates the
huge importance of being explicit in this respect in order to avoid joint endogeneity of
International Outsourcing with employment or wage eects.
In more recent recent years, economic literature started to consider labor market
imperfections as well, not at least in an attempt to better ﬁt the theoretical results to
empirical ﬁndings as observed e.g. in the major European economies. There, due to
powerful unions and high social standards, labor markets are characterized by rigid
wages for low skilled labor. Violating the typically posed ﬂexible wage assumption
and introducing dierent forms of wage rigidity, results of the impact of International
Outsourcing on labor are likely to change. As Krugman (1995) illuminates, trade impli-
cationsdierfundamentallybetweenaEuropeancase(assumingwagerigidity)andan
American one (assuming ﬂexible wages): With wage rigidity, a decrease in the produc-
tion of the low skill intensive good leads to an increase of low skilled unemployment.
Even if the eects of wage rigidities are well known since the discussion in Brecher
(1974a,b),1 theoretical investigations analyzing the eects with respect to International
Outsourcing activities are still rare.
Skaksen (2004) e.g. examines the eects of International Outsourcing occurring in
unionized labor markets. Since his general equilibrium model considers only one-
sector and one kind of labor, it is not applicable to discuss the important factor or sector
bias of International Outsourcing and thus, to ﬁt into the main part of the Interna-
tional Outsourcing literature. Nevertheless, results are quite interesting: When ﬁrms
relocate production fragments abroad, the wage rate increases in tandem with unem-
ployment. Kohler (2007) investigates eects of International Outsourcing and embeds
the results into the German discussion on the Bazaar Economy. Even though his main
analysis occurs within a ﬂexible wage economy, Kohler mentions the importance of
wage rigidity and distills few points that may be of formal interest, like e.g. the skill
intensity of the relocated production fragments. Considering one industry facing a
heterogeneous labor market, Koskela and Stenbacka (2007) investigate the eects of
International Outsourcing and a solidaristically wage setting monopolistic labor union
on the wage dierential as well as unemployment for both skill groups. Following an
increase of the wage dierential due to outsourcing activities, unemployment of the
high skilled increases while unemployment of the low skilled decreases. With unem-
1For recent examinations of dierent subsidization schemes within a traditional HOS framework con-
sidering skill biased technical progress in hand with labor market rigidities, see e.g. Dluhosch and
Horgos (2008). Dluhosch (2008) enriches a traditional HO model with labor market rigidities and
investigates the implications of globalization and skill biased technical change as well.
3ploymentarisingnotinhand,butasaconsequenceofwagesettings,thisresultconﬂicts
with traditionally assumed implications of International Outsourcing discriminating
low skilled labor. Modeling International Outsourcing similar as in Jones (2000) and
Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) and introducing a fair-wage approach (see Solow, 1979;
Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1988, 1990) to focus on a special form of labor market
imperfection, Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) present a model where wage inequal-
ity is able to coexists with unemployment. Thus, using a novel diagrammatic tool
(based on the Lerner-Pearce diagram), they are able to address major public concerns
of International Outsourcing: With high skill intensive home production, International
Outsourcing mitigates the unemployment problem and reduces the high skill wage
premium. Additionally, they explore how preferences with respect to fair wages and
the size of employment beneﬁts govern employment eects.
When leaving the theoretical world and studying the empirical literature, there is no
contribution examining the dierences in labor market implications occurring when
International Outsourcing takes place in industries characterized by a rigid wage ﬂoor.
Since there is a lack of macro-variables indicating the degree of an industry’s labor
market inﬂexibility, the necessary information needs to be generated. This statistical
problem, however, may be the reason for the lack of empirical evidence testing the few
theoretical results which recently emerged in this ﬁeld of research. This paper tries to
contribute to ﬁll this gap.
Therefore, it ﬁrst provides a formal model investigating how general equilibrium
eects of International Outsourcing change if ﬂexible wages are displaced by rigid
wages for low skilled labor. In order to ﬁt into the recently emerged discussion of
the importance of the sector vs. the factor bias of International Outsourcing, the
model assumes two sectors with two primary inputs of labor. Section 2 introduces the
basic framework. Using Shephard’s Lemma (cf. Shephard, 1953, 1970) and following
the line of Uzawa (1964), Diewert (1971, 1974), Woodland (1977), and Mussa (1979),
the model builds on the modern duality approach in international trade theory. In
ordertoachievetheﬂexiblewagebenchmarkmodel, Section3introducesInternational
Outsourcing similar to skill biased technical change as deﬁned in Jones (1965) and
analyzes the occurring implications for general equilibrium. In Section 4, the ﬂexible
wage assumption is violated by introducing wage rigidity for low skilled labor as
in Brecher (1974a,b). As it turns out, results dier fundamentally from the ﬂexible
wage approach. When International Outsourcing takes place in the relative high skill
intensive industry, relative wages of the high skilled still increase, however, not as
strong as in the ﬂexible wage scenario. In order to keep production positive, and to
maintain the minimum cost level, the relative low skill intensive industry has to reduce
output. This additional reduction in output forces the industry to set low skilled labor
free. Since not all of these workers can be absorbed by the expanding relative high
4skill intensive industry, International Outsourcing increases unemployment of the low
skilled as we move down the Rybczynski line towards the new equilibrium situation.
Section 5 presents empirical results supporting the theoretical ﬁndings. Applying a
logit model to analyze a German microeconomic panel data, results show that the
probability for low skilled labor to get unemployed increases dramatically in extend
and signiﬁcance, if International Outsourcing takes place in industries characterized
by low skilled wage rigidity. Section 6 concludes by summarizing the major ﬁndings
and addressing some questions of high political relevance.
2 Theoretical Framework
In order to formally investigate equilibrium eects of International Outsourcing, this
section uses the modern duality approach in international trade theory. Based upon
an algebraic simplicity known as Shephard’s Lemma, equilibrium conditions in the
production sector are formulated in terms of unit cost functions rather than production
functions. Following the line of Uzawa (1964), Diewert (1971, 1974), Woodland (1977),
and Mussa (1979), this leads to a cost minimization problem in a factor-price space.
The advantage of minimizing unit costs rather than maximizing output can be derived
fromShephard(1953,1970): Withunitcostfunctionsdierentiableatthefactorpricew,
the cost minimizing input-output-coecients can simply be obtained with the partial
derivative of the unit cost functions with respect to wages.
Consider an economy facing given world prices p with two industries, a relative
high skill intensive (X) and a relative low skill intensive one (Y). Both industries use
two primary inputs, low skilled labor L and high skilled labor H to produce goods of
quantity qi (with i = X;Y). The production function is of a typical Cobb Douglas kind
withconstantreturnstoscale. Goodsaswellasfactormarketsareperfectlycompetitive
with factors mobile between industries, but immobile between countries. The home
country faces an inelastic supply of labor (¯ L, ¯ H) and remains incompletely specialized
(qi > 0). In order to keep the model traceable, we focus on the supply side of the
economy in setting the elasticity of demand unity (D = 1). Thus, the world market
is assumed to absorb changes in demand and, since ˆ p = 0, possible eects from price
changes. Thus, with free entry in both industries, we achieve the unit cost functions
equaling the price
cX = aXLwL + aXHwH = p (1)
cY = aYLwL + aYHwH = 1 (2)
with ci as unit costs, aij as unit factor requirements (j = L;H), wj as factor prices, the
price of the relative low skill intensive good Y as numeraire, and the relative price of
5good X as p  pX=pY. When partially dierentiating the unit cost functions with respect

















as cost minimizing labor unit requirements. Additionally, we have to consider
aXLqX + aYLqY = ¯ L (7)
aXHqX + aYHqY = ¯ H (8)
aslabormarketequilibriumconditions. Thus, wehaveasystemofeightendogenous
variables (wH, wL, aXL, aXH, aYL, aYH, qX, and qY) in eight equations (1) - (8) that exactly
determine the model.
3 General Equilibrium Effects of International
Outsourcing: The Benchmark Model
In order to enable the industries relocating their production fragments abroad, we
deﬁne 'ij as an International Outsourcing parameter, similar to skill biased technical
changeasdeﬁnedinJones(1965). SinceInternationalOutsourcingisassumedtoreduce
labor unit requirements, the percentage change ˆ 'ij    1
aij(@aij=@IO) is a measure showing
the alteration in aij due to International Outsourcing activities (IO) that would take
place at constant wages.2 Thus, we have to rewrite the unit cost functions (1) and (2)
into
cX(~ wL; ~ wH) = ~ aXL~ wL +~ aXH~ wH (9)
cY(~ wL; ~ wH) = ~ aYL~ wL +~ aYH~ wH (10)
2In this contribution, International Outsourcing is deﬁned in a broad sense, without considering or-
ganizational ﬁrm characteristics. Thus, International Outsourcing activities indicate a reduction in
domestic labor unit requirements of the respective skill group, without distinguishing whether the
production fragment relocated abroad is produced in-house or at arm’s length. In order to keep the
model traceable, determinants of International Outsourcing are also excluded. Thus, International
Outsourcing here is modeled as illustrated in Arndt (1997, 1998a,b).
6with ~ wj 
wj
'ij and ~ aij  'ijaij as wages and labor unit requirements considering
International Outsourcing activities. To minimize unit costs, (9) and (10) are totally
dierentiated in order to obtain
XL ˆ wL + XH ˆ wH = XL ˆ 'XL + XH ˆ 'XH (11)
YL ˆ wL + YH ˆ wH = YL ˆ 'YL + YH ˆ 'YH (12)
as equilibrium production in both industries with factor income shares ij 
aijwj
pi and
“hats” over variables denoting percentage changes. As (11) and (12) show, in principle,
therearefourInternationalOutsourcingsituations: Bothindustriescaneitheroutsource
their low skill intensive or their high skill intensive production block.
In order to keep the focus on analyzing the changes of International Outsourcing
implications occurring in rigid wage industries, it is sucient to consider only the
InternationalOutsourcingsituation, inwhichthehighskillintensiveindustryrelocates
its low skill intensive production fragments.3 Thus, with ˆ 'XL > 0 and ˆ 'XH = ˆ 'YL =
ˆ 'YH = 0, (11) and (12) change to
XL ˆ wL + XH ˆ wH = XL ˆ 'XL (13)
YL ˆ wL + YH ˆ wH = 0 (14)
Wages and Labor Unit Requirements
To examine the eects of International Outsourcing on wages, we can solve (13) and
(14) for the change in low and high skilled wages and obtain








with  as the determinant of the matrix of factor income shares  
0
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3As known from the sector bias of International Outsourcing (cf. Arndt, 1997, 1998a,b), low skilled
wages increase if International Outsourcing takes place in the relative low skill intensive industry.











Figure 1: Eects of International Outsourcing on wages (low skill parts of relative high
skill intensive industry)
as the percentage change in relative high skilled wages. Since  > 0, International
Outsourcing of the low skill intensive production block in the relative high skill inten-
sive industry increases the relative wage of the high skilled ˆ wH   ˆ wL > 0, as depicted in
the Mussa-Woodland-Figure 1.
Since the relative high skill intensive industry relocates its low skill intensive pro-
duction block, it needs less low skilled labor to produce one unit of commodity X. As
the economy faces given world prices, this induces a reduction of unit costs. Thus,
the respective unit cost curve shifts horizontally outward. Since relative wages of the
high skilled increase in both industries, high skilled labor gains from this International
Outsourcing activity in receiving a wage premium.
As we know from Shephard’s Lemma (3) - (6), equilibrium labor unit requirements
can be obtained by dierentiating the unit cost functions partially with respect to the
wages. Considering International Outsourcing (~ aij = aij'ij =
@ci




ˆ aXL = XH( ˆ wH   ˆ wL + ˆ 'XL   ˆ 'XH)   ˆ 'XL (18)
ˆ aXH =  XL( ˆ wH   ˆ wL + ˆ 'XL   ˆ 'XH)   ˆ 'XH (19)
ˆ aYL = YH( ˆ wH   ˆ wL + ˆ 'YL   ˆ 'YH)   ˆ 'YL (20)
ˆ aYH =  YL( ˆ wH   ˆ wL + ˆ 'YL   ˆ 'YH)   ˆ 'YH (21)
as the percentage change of the cost minimizing labor unit requirements. Now
consider that only ˆ 'XL > 0 and substitute for the change in relative wages (17) we
obtain




as the percentage change of relative labor unit requirements. Since International
Outsourcing increases relative wages of the high skilled, relative labor unit require-
ments of the high skilled decrease in both industries. Thus, both industries shift skill
requirements toward more low skilled labor.4
Output and Employment
To investigate the eects of International Outsourcing on output, take the total dier-
ential of the full employment conditions (7) and (8). In equilibrium, we obtain
ˆ qXXL + ˆ qYYL =  (ˆ aXLXL + ˆ aYLYL) (23)
ˆ qXXH + ˆ qYYH =  (ˆ aXHXH + ˆ aYHYH) (24)
with labor shares iL 
Li
L and iH 
Hi
H. Substituting for the changes of labor
unit requirements and relative wages we can solve these equations for the percentage





XL ˆ 'XL + XL ˆ 'XL (25)
ˆ qY =  
HXL + LXH

XL ˆ 'XL (26)
with L  XLXH + YLYH, H  XHXL + YHYL, and the determinant of the
matrix of labor shares  > 0 with  
0




C C C C C A. Since International Outsourcing
makes the respective industry more competitive on world markets, output increases
in the relative high skill intensive industry (ˆ qX > 0), whereas output of the industry
remaining integrated decreases (ˆ qY < 0).
As we know, assuming wage ﬂexibility, high and low skilled labor remain fully em-
ployed. However, provided that labor can freely move between the industries, within
industry employment eects arise. Taking the total dierential of the full employment
conditions and substituting for the change in relative wages, labor unit requirements
as well as output, we obtain
4The unambiguity of this result depends strongly on the assumption of a Cobb Douglas production
process and the ﬂexible wage set-up. Since the shift toward more low skill intensive production does
not hold empirically, this may be a ﬁrst hint pointing to labor market rigidities. Then, ﬁrms would
reduce low skill employment which adds to unemployment (cf. Dluhosch, 2008).
9ˆ LX =
XH + (HYL + LYH)

XL ˆ 'XL (27)
ˆ LY =
YH   (HXL + LXH)

XL ˆ 'XL (28)
ˆ HX =
(HYL + LYH)   XL

XL ˆ 'XL (29)
ˆ HY =  
YL + (HXL + LXH)

XL ˆ 'XL (30)
as the percentage change in within industry employment of low and high skilled
labor. Since International Outsourcing increases employment of the low skilled in the
relative high skill intensive industry (ˆ LX > 0), employment of the low skilled in the
relative low skill intensive industry has to decrease (ˆ LY < 0). The same pattern occurs
for high skilled labor. With employment of the high skilled decreasing in the relative
lowskillintensiveindustry( ˆ HY < 0)employmentofthehighskilledintherelativehigh
skill intensive industry has to increase ( ˆ HX > 0). Thus, since International Outsourcing
increases output in the relative high skill intensive industry, low as well as high skilled
labor quit employment in the low skill intensive industry and move to the high skill
intensive one.
Summarizing the Main Findings
Sincetherelativehighskillintensiveindustryrelocatesitslowskillintensiveproduction
block, itneedslesslowskilledlaborandthus, facesareductioninunitcosts. Assuming
an economy facing given world prices, the additional return is used to pay a wage
premium for high skilled labor. Thus, with labor assumed to be mobile between the
industries, relative wages of the high skilled increase in both industries. Consequently,
labor unit requirements of high skilled labor decrease. This implies a skill shift toward
more low skilled labor. Since the industry facing International Outsourcing activities
gets more competitive on world markets, output increases while output of the other
industry (the one keeping its integrated production structure) decreases. All these
results have to be considered for the eects on within industries’ employment: Since
labor moves from the contracting relative low skill intensive to the expanding relative
high skill intensive industry, low skill as well as high skill employment increases in the
industry with International Outsourcing activities, while it decreases in the industry
remaining integrated.
4 General Equilibrium Effects with Wage Rigidity
After examining general equilibrium eects of International Outsourcing with ﬂexible
wages, this section considers an empirically more realistic scenario for major European
10economies. There, powerful unions as well as high social standards induce some kind
of wage rigidity for low skilled labor. As employees would not accept wages beneath
themarginsetbysocialstandards,wagesarepreventedfromadjustingtoshocks. Thus,
results are likely to dier fundamentally from the ﬂexible wage benchmark model. In
order to consider these dierences we violate the ﬂexible wage assumption and subject
the entire labor market of the economy to a wage ﬂoor for low skilled labor. Following
Brecher (1974a,b), labor market inﬂexibility is modeled with real wages for the low
skilled rigid with respect to the numeraire.
The rigid wage, exogenously given in real terms, is speciﬁed at a ﬁxed level denoted
by ¯ wL, the real wage before the respective industry decides to relocate production
fragments abroad. Thus, at ¯ wL low skilled labor is fully employed but with downward
inﬂexibility of the real wage
wL  ¯ wL or ˆ wL  0 (31)
To investigate the implications of International Outsourcing with wage rigidity as-
sume again the case that the relative high skill intensive industry relocates its low skill
intensive production fragment ( ˆ 'XL > 0 whereas ˆ 'XH = ˆ 'YL = ˆ 'YH = 0). As we know
from(15)and(17)realwagesofthelowskilleddecreaseinabsoluteaswellasinrelative
terms. Thus, the above deﬁned minimum wage (31) is binding, preventing low skilled
wages from downward adjustment ( ˆ wL = 0).
With wage rigidity we have to rewrite (13) and (14) and obtain
XH ˆ wH = XL ˆ 'XL (32)
YH ˆ wH = 0 (33)
as equilibrium conditions. Solving for the percentage change in high skill wages,
dierent results ceteris paribus emerge for the two industries
As Figure 2 shows, International Outsourcing of the low skill intensive production
fragment in the relative high skill intensive industry shifts the respective unit cost
function horizontally outside. Due to the wage rigidity for the low skilled, wages of
the high skilled increase in the same industry but, in a ﬁrst step, remain unchanged
in the relative low skill intensive industry. As we assumed labor to be completely
mobile between industries, the high skilled employed in the relative low skill intensive
industry would immediately move to the relative high skill intensive industry in order
to achieve the wage premium. Thus, the low skill intensive industry would stop
production. However, holding to the assumption of incomplete specialization, this is
not an equilibrium anymore. Thus, in order to keep production positive, the relative










Figure 2: Eects of International Outsourcing on wages (with wage rigidity)
the relative high skill intensive industry ( ˆ wYH = ˆ wXH = ˆ wH =
XL
XH ˆ 'XL). Then, however,
the relative low skill intensive industry is no longer producing at minimum costs. The
only way for the relative low skill intensive industry to remain at the minimum cost
level is to reduce output.
Wages and Labor Unit Requirements
Provided that the relative low skill intensive industry has to accept the high skill wage
premium, implied by International Outsourcing occurring in the relative high skill
intensive industry, and since the wage ﬂoor for low skilled labor is binding ( ˆ wL = 0),
the change in relative wages of the high skilled equals the respective absolute change
with




Thus, also with a wage ﬂoor for low skilled labor, International Outsourcing in
the relative high skill intensive industry increases relative wages of the high skilled,
however, not as strong as in the ﬂexible wage scenario






ˆ 'XL > 0 (35)
since   XH   YH < XH. Thus, the minimum wage for low skill labor mildens
the widening of the wage gap.
For the eects of International Outsourcing on relative labor unit requirements re-
member(18)-(21)andsubstituteforthechangeofrelativewagesassumingthebinding
12minimum wage (34). Solving for the change in relative labor unit requirements, we
obtain




Since relative wages of the high skilled increase also with a minimum wage for low
skilled labor, International Outsourcing again induces a skill shift towards more low
skilled labor in both industries. However, the skill shift is, as the eects on relative
wages, not as strong with wage rigidity as with ﬂexible wages.
Output and Employment
In order to achieve the equilibrium pattern of output and employment, call the en-
dowment of the economy with ﬁxed overall factor supplies (¯ L and ¯ H) constraining the
employment conditions. With the assumption of wage rigidity, we have to rewrite (7)
and obtain
L  aXLqX + aYLqY  ¯ L (37)
considering that unemployment of the low skilled may occur (ˆ L  0). Thus, there is
the possibility of low skilled labor being not employed in the X or in the Y industry.
Since high skill wages remain ﬂexible, high skilled labor stays fully utilized
H  aXHqX + aYHqY = ¯ H (38)
Taking the total dierential of the employment conditions (37 and 38), we obtain
ˆ qXXL + ˆ qYYL = ˆ L   (ˆ aXLXL + ˆ aYLYL) (39)
ˆ qXXH + ˆ qYYH =  (ˆ aXHXH + ˆ aYHYH) (40)
asequilibriumcondition. Consideringthechangesinlaborunitrequirementsaswell
as relative wages, we can solve (39) and (40) for ˆ qX and ˆ qY and achieve
ˆ qX =









ˆ qY =  









as equilibrium output patterns for both industries. Since low skilled labor was fully
employed before slicing up the value chain, employment of the low skilled can either
13remain unchanged or decrease (ˆ L  0). Thus, International Outsourcing increases
output in the relative high skill intensive industry and leads to a contraction of the
relativelowskillintensiveone. Bycontrasttothebenchmark-caseofﬂexiblewages,the
changeinoutputoccurringwithrigidwagesisduetotwodierentforces,one“normal”
eect of the International Outsourcing activity as well as an “additional” eect as the
low skill intensive industry sets low skilled labor free (ˆ LY  0), in order to maintain the
minimum cost level. Since XH > YH, the change of low skilled employment decreases
the output in the relative low skill intensive industry (Y) by more than it expands







To examine the eects on employment, consider again the change within the indus-
tries. Substituting for the change in relative wages, the change in labor unit require-
ments as well as the change in output, we obtain
























as the eects of International Outsourcing on within industries’ high skill employ-
ment. Provided that high skilled wages stay ﬂexible, the relative low skill intensive
industry (Y) again decreases employment of the high skilled ( ˆ HY  0), whereas the
relativehigh skillintensive industryincreases highskilled employment. For thewithin








as the long run equilibrium. Thus, after some painful adjustment processes in the
shortrun,someofthelowskilledlaborsetfreeintherelativelowskillintensiveindustry
(Y) is absorbed by the relative high skill intensive industry (X). However, since not
all of the unemployed low skilled can be absorbed at given wages by the relative high
skill intensive industry (X), International Outsourcing of the low skill intensive parts
in the relative high skill intensive industry increases unemployment of the low skilled
as long as we move down the Rybczynski line to ﬁnd the new equilibrium situation.
Summarizing the Main Findings
Subjecting the labor market of the economy to a rigid wage ﬂoor for low skilled labor,
International Outsourcing of the low skill intensive part in the relative high skill inten-
sive industry enables the industry to pay a high skill wage premium. However, due
to the wage rigidity, high skill wages do not increase in the relative low skill intensive
industry in the ﬁrst step. Thus, since the high skilled in the relative low skill intensive
14industry would move to the relative high skill intensive one, in order to beneﬁt from
the wage premium, the low skill intensive industry would stop production. This is no
equilibrium situation holding to the assumption of incomplete specialization. Thus,
the relative low skill intensive industry has to accept the high skill wage premium. In
order to remain at the minimum level of unit costs, the industry has to reduce output.
Thus, absolute as well as relative wages of the high skilled increase in both industries,
however, not as strong as in the ﬂexible wage scenario. Assuming Cobb Douglas pro-
duction structures, this induces a skill shift in both industries towards more low skilled
labor. With wage rigidity, the output pattern depends on two dierent forces. Since
International Outsourcing increases the competitiveness in the relative high skill inten-
sive industry, the industry expands while the low skill intensive contracts. However,
since the relative low skill intensive industry is forced to accept the high skill wage
premium paid in the relative high skill intensive industry, there is an additional force
constraining the low skill intensive industry. Since the low skilled labor set free by
the relative low skill intensive industry can not be completely absorbed by the rela-
tive high skill intensive one, we move the Rybczynski line downward, with low skill
unemployment increasing until we reach the new equilibrium situation.
5 Empirical Evidence for Germany
In order to empirically test the theoretical ﬁndings stated above, this section provides
a micro-econometric panel data analysis investigating the dierent implications of
International Outsourcing that occur when being adopted in a ﬂexible wage industry,
or in an industry characterized by a rigid wage ﬂoor for low skilled labor instead. Due
to small but important dierences between the empirical situation and the theoretical
assumptions made above, empirical results are expected to dier slightly from the
theoretical ﬁndings. Thus, the expected empirical outcomes are stressed ﬁrst, before
the section describes the data and the econometric tests in detail.
In order to focus on a long run perspective and to keep the theoretical equilibrium
traceable, onecrucialassumptionimposedwaslaborbeingcompletelymobilebetween
theindustries. This,however,isnotreﬂectedinthedata. Duetopersonalcharacteristics
like e.g. education or family status, labor is not completely mobile empirically. Thus,
painfulshortrunadjustmenteectsneedtobeaccepted. Giventhesefacts,International
Outsourcing is expected to increase unemployment of the low skilled when taking
place in high skill intensive industries, even when wages can adjust. However, when
outsourcing takes place in industries with wage rigidity, the increase in unemployment
is expected to be more extensive. When Outsourcing takes place in the relative low
skill intensive industries, unemployment of the low skilled should not increase since
the wage ﬂoor is assumed not to be binding. At more aggregated industry levels, like
15the whole economy or the service industry, we are not able to make any presumptions.
Data and Econometric Methodology
In order to provide empirical evidence for the way wage rigidity aects International
Outsourcing implications, the analysis bases on microeconomic panel data for the
German economy between 1991 and 2000. Within a multiple logit model, individual
unemployment is regressed on the International Outsourcing activity of the industry
the individual’s employed in, as well as several variables controlling for observable
individual-speciﬁc as well as industry-speciﬁc characteristics.
Uijt = 0 + 1VSjt + 2Yjt + 3ageit + 4deastit + 5dmaleit + j + t + i + it (46)
U isabinaryvariableindicatingifindividualiisunemployedattimet,VSisanindex
proxying International Outsourcing activities in industry j at time t,5 Y is the output
of industry j, age the age of individual i. The dummy variable deast indicates if the
individual’s residence is in East Germany, and the dummy variable dmale the gender
of the individual. Additionally, we control for time speciﬁc eects (), industry speciﬁc
eects (), as well as unobservable individual heterogeneity (). Thus, with the error
term  allowing for unspeciﬁed correlation of errors within industries, the regression
cares for contemporaneous correlation even though maximum likelihood estimation is
used instead of OLS.6 In order to focus on the implications of wage rigidity, we run
this regression for all industries and compare the results with results when considering
only rigid wage industries.
The data is taken from the German Socio Economic Panel GSOEP and from input-
output tables provided by the German Federal Statistical Oce. The input-output
tables are used to calculate the VS-index and the output of each two-digit NACE
industry for the period 1991 to 2000. The endogenous variable U, indicating the
employment status of an individual, is taken from the GSOEP (waves H/8, 1991 to
Q/17, 2000). The GSOEP additionally provides information on the age of an individual,
5On a more aggregated industry level it is necessary to proxy International Outsourcing activities.
Therefore, several indices are developed and some of them are very common in use. One of these







pjt with q as total inputs from industry w used in industry j, p as production
value in industry j, m as total imports and s as the domestic use of goods w. For a descriptive
overview of International Outsourcing activities in Germany, measured by the VS-index, and an
empirical investigation of often used International Outsourcing indices, see Horgos (2009).
6See Moulton (1990) for the necessity to include industry controls in order to account for correlation
of errors within groups and thus, to provide spurious regression when estimating the eects of
macro-variables on micro-units.
16the individual’s residence, gender, as well as the education of each individual with
respect to the international comparable ISCED from UNESCO (1997).7
In order to perform the required estimations, additional information on the existence
of wage rigidity at the industry level is needed. However, since wage rigidity is
typically not observable on a more aggregated sectoral bases, there is a need to proxy
wage rigidity at the industry level. This, however, is an empirical challenge and thus,
may be the reason why there is no empirical evidence for wage rigidities aecting the
implication of economic phenomena, like e.g. International Outsourcing activities. In
order to generate an indicator denoting if an industry is characterized by a rigid wage
structure or not, the analysis follows a similar procedure as in Holden (2004), Goette
et al. (2007), Knoppik and Beissinger (2005), and Bauer et al. (2007).8
Inordertoobtaintheinformationwhetheranindustryischaracterizedbyrigidwages
for the low skilled or not, the percentage change of the mean wage ˆ wit of the low skilled
is calculated for each year in each two-digit NACE industry as a ﬁrst step. Based on
the percentage changes, a normalized distribution of the corresponding wage changes
per industry-year is generated by adjusting the empirically observed wage changes
with the industry speciﬁc median and standard deviation ˆ wn
it 
ˆ wit ( ˆ w)i
sd( ˆ w)i . Afterward,
the industry-year speciﬁc samples of the empirical distribution need to be calculated.
As the empirical samples and their moments are stochastic and thus burdened with
unknown uncertainty, a bootstrap method is used. Thus, we create a distribution of
the low skilled wage changes in bootstrapping the empirically observed percentage
changes for each industry-year sample. Based on the generated empirical distribution,
the number of wage cuts per industry is calculated and, in this regard, the respective
probability of a wage cut occurring in this industry is computed. The empirically
observed probability of wage cuts needs to be related to a normalized probability
of wage cuts (assuming no wage rigidity). Therefore, a notional distribution of the
normalized wage cuts is created by adjusting the normalized wage changes with the
bootstrapped mean and standard deviation ˜ wit  ˆ wn
itsdB + B. Based on this notional
normalizeddistribution,thenumberofwagecutsandtherespectiveprobabilityofthese
wage cuts occurring per industry are calculated. The notional normalized probability
of wage cuts per industry can then be related to the empirically observed probability
of wage cuts per industry. If the empirically observed probability of wage cuts per
industry is smaller than the notional normalized one, it is assumed that the respective
7In line with the ISCED, low skill educated workers are deﬁned as individuals with primary, lower
secondary or second stage of basic education, whereas high skilled workers are individuals with
some form of post secondary education.
8FormorepapersonthemeasurementofwagerigiditiesseethespecialeditionoftheEconomicJournal,
Vol. 117, Iss. 524, Nov. 2007.
17Table 1: Eects on low skilled unemployment in Germany (1)





























































Observations 16;194 13;195 9;921 7;218
Groups 5;039 4;173 3;563 2;664
Prob > chi2 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000
Industry Controls YES YES YES YES
Year Controls YES YES YES YES
Region Controls YES YES YES YES
(z-Statistics in parantheses)
* / ** / *** signiﬁcant at 10 / 5 / 1 percent
industry is characterized by rigid wages for low skilled labor.9
Results
In order to empirically test the eects of wage rigidity on the implications of Interna-
tional Outsourcing activities, (46) is ﬁrst regressed for the whole economy, diering
between all industries and industries with rigid wages for low skilled labor.10 The
results are presented in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 1.
9Table 3 in the Appendix provides an overview of the two-digit NACE industries in Germany charac-
terized as rigid-wage industries due to this classiﬁcation (considering the period 1991-2000).
10Since it can not be assumed that the individuals exhibit a systematic intercept, but instead, that they
are randomly drawn from a binomial distribution, all the models below are tested using a random-
eects logit estimator. Additionally, since the data consists of a huge amount of observations and
a comparably small amount of years, the random eects logit model can be assumed to be much
more ecient than its ﬁxed eects variant. When regressing the unemployment status on the
contemporaneous industries’ output, a possible endogeneity problem could be assumed. Therefore,
Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests are applied to assure that possible endogeneity does not signiﬁcantly
aect the consistency of the estimated coecients.
18As the results show, International Outsourcing (proxied by the VS index) increases
the probability of low skilled labor to get unemployed, however, with a z-value of
1.60, not at a statistically signiﬁcant level. By contrast, when considering that Interna-
tional Outsourcing takes place in industries with wage rigidity for low skilled labor,
the probability of getting unemployed due to International Outsourcing activities is
twice as high, and in addition, highly statistically signiﬁcant at a level of 1 percent.
The included control variables also yield a variety of very interesting results. While
the output of an industry has only insigniﬁcant eects, the individual control variables
strongly inﬂuence the possibility of an individual getting unemployed on a statistically
signiﬁcant level. The age of an individual, e.g., decreases the probability of getting
unemployed slightly, but statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Living in the
eastern part of Germany or being female, by contrast, signiﬁcantly increases the like-
lihood of getting unemployed. These highly statistically signiﬁcant eects ensure that
the overall model is ﬁtted well with highly signiﬁcant chi2-values. The model is based
on approx. 15,000 individual observations, includes industry, year, and region controls
to avoid contemporaneous correlation, and thus, is necessarily representative to derive
generalizable results.
WhenInternationalOutsourcingtakesplaceintheservicesector, resultsalsoconﬁrm
the increasing eect of wage rigidity on unemployment of the low skilled. Considering
allserviceindustries,InternationalOutsourcingindeedincreasestheprobabilityforthe
low skilled to get unemployed, however, as for the whole economy, not at a statistically
signiﬁcantlevel. Whenfocusingsolelyontheserviceindustriescharacterizedbyarigid
wage ﬂoor for low skilled labor, the eect is nearly twice as intensive and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. The results of the other control variables conﬁrm the
above stated ﬁndings, as well as the robustness of the model.
After providing empirical evidence for more aggregated industry levels, the results
presented in Table 2 move the focus on more disaggregated industry levels, the high
as well as low skill intensive industries of the manufacturing sector. Considering the
above mentioned dierences between the theoretical model (adopting a long run per-
spective) and the empirical methodology (accounting for short run adjustment) the
empirical results strongly support the theoretical picture of section 4. If International
Outsourcingtakesplaceinhighskillintensiveindustries,theprobabilityforlowskilled
individuals to get unemployed increases, statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
However, when International Outsourcing takes place in high skill intensive industries
characterized by wage rigidity for low skilled labor, the probability of getting unem-
ployed nearly doubles and becomes statistically even more signiﬁcant with the z-value
increasing up to 2.16. The results of the additional control variables do not change
compared to the whole economy, however, the gender and the east German dummy
variable are outside the statistically signiﬁcant range.
19Table 2: Eects on low skilled unemployment in Germany (2)





























































Observations 2;768 2;738 3;042 2;802
Groups 1;018 1;003 1;085 1;006
Prob > chi2 0:0120 0:0043 0:0330 0:0238
Industry Controls YES YES YES YES
Year Controls YES YES YES YES
Region Controls YES YES YES YES
(z-Statistics in parantheses)
* / ** / *** signiﬁcant at 10 / 5 / 1 percent
When International Outsourcing takes place in the relative low skill intensive in-
dustries, the probability for the low skilled to get unemployed decreases, however,
not at a statistically signiﬁcant level. This result, occurring even in industries with
wage rigidity, supports the expected results known from the sector bias of Interna-
tional Outsourcing (cf. Arndt, 1997): Since low skilled labor gains when International
Outsourcingoccursinrelativelowskillintensiveindustries,thedemandforlowskilled
labor increases as does employment and wages. Thus, a possible wage ﬂoor would
not be binding and unemployment would be expected to decrease. The results of the
included control variables again conﬁrm the ﬁndings. One interesting point to note
additionally is that the increasing eect of being a female on the probability of the low
skilled to get unemployed is statistically signiﬁcant, and even much higher, in relative
low skill intensive industries compared to the relative high skill intensive ones.
6 Conclusion
In order to examine general equilibrium eects of International Outsourcing, research
mostly assumes a ﬂexible wage set-up. However, in major European economies, labor
20markets are characterized by powerful unions and high social standards, inducing an
implicit wage rigidity for low skilled labor. While only few contributions theoretically
examining International Outsourcing eects within a rigid-wage economy emerged
recently, there is still no empirical evidence which support these ﬁndings. This paper
contributes to ﬁll this gap.
Therefore, general equilibrium eects of International Outsourcing are formally ex-
amined by employing a modern duality approach. Assuming a binding wage ﬂoor for
low skilled labor, results dier fundamentally from the ﬂexible wage scenario: With
International Outsourcing of the low skill intensive production block in the relative
high skill intensive industry, real wages of the high skilled increase in the outsourcing
industry while ceteris paribus not changing in the relative low skill intensive industry.
However, with labor completely mobile between industries, the relative low skill in-
tensive industry had to quit production since all high skilled would move to the skill
intensive industry. Thus, for staying aﬂoat, the relative low skill intensive industry is
forced to accept the high skill wage premium and thus, to decrease output. Therefore,
International Outsourcing increases relative wages of the high skilled, however, not
as strong as in the ﬂexible wage scenario. This induces a skill shift in both industries
toward more low skilled labor. Since the outsourcing industry gets more competitive
on world markets, it expands while output in the industry remaining integrated de-
creases. However, since wage rigidity forces the low skill intensive industry to set low
skilled labor free, the contraction of the industry gets additionally ampliﬁed. Since not
all of the low skilled can be absorbed by the high skill intensive industry, unemploy-
ment of the low skilled occurs as we move down the Rybczynski line toward the new
equilibrium. Thus, the smaller increase of the wage gap occurring with International
Outsourcing in a rigid wage economy has to be bought dearly with unemployment of
low skilled labor.
The link between International Outsourcing and the increase of low skilled unem-
ployment when low skilled wages are assumed to be rigid is tested within a micro-
econometric panel data analysis. Therefore, a variable indicating if wages are rigid
within an industry is created. The empirical results strongly support the theoretical
ﬁndings: If International Outsourcing takes place in industries characterized by in-
ﬂexible labor markets, the probability of an individual getting unemployed increases
dramatically in extent and signiﬁcance.
Since the link between International Outsourcing and labor market imperfections
is rarely explored yet, plenty of room exists for future research. Empirical contri-
butions could also investigate the remaining general equilibrium eects occurring if
International Outsourcing takes place in rigid wage industries. It would e.g. be worth
examining the dierence of the implications on the wage gap between low and high
skilled labor as well as on the output of the industries. However, not only the eects of
21International Outsourcing are worth being examined: The change in determinants of
International Outsourcing due to wage rigidity would additionally being worth to get
investigated. Maybe there is a force of minimum wages toward more or less Interna-
tional Outsourcing activities, leading an economy to even more intensively participate
or to retire from the international division of labor.
This contribution tries not to explain the main causes for unemployment in major
European economies. Instead, the paper highlights the importance of labor market
institutions to gain or lose from a non-stoppable economic process, International Out-
sourcing. Policy makers can either stand for more ﬂexibility, and accept a larger wage
gap,orformorerigidlabormarkets,andbuyingadecreaseinthewagegapdearlywith
low skilled unemployment. Thus, in terms of unemployment, not International Out-
sourcing but inﬂexible labor market institutions should instead be blamed for harming
low skilled labor.
22Appendix: Wage Rigidity at the 2-digit NACE Industry Level
Table 3: 2-digit NACE industries with a rigid wage structure
NACE Industry Wage Rigidity NACE Industry Wage Rigidity
1 Agriculture 1 41 Water collection, treatment and supply 0
2 Forestry 0 45 Construction of buildings 1
5 Fishing 0 50 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor
vehicles
0
10 Mining of cole and lignite 1 51 Wholesale trade 1
11 Extraction of crude petroleaum and natural gas 0 52 Retail trade 1
12 Mining of iron ores 0 55 Accomodation 1
13 Mining of non-ferrous metal ores 0 60 Land transport and transport via pipelines 1
14 Quarrying of stone, sand and clay 0 61 Water transport 0
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 1 62 Air transport 0
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 0 63 Warehousing and support activities for trans-
portation
1
17 Manufacture of textiles 1 64 Postal and courier activities 1
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel 1 65 Financial service activities, except insurance 1
19 Manufacture of leather and related products 1 66 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding 1
20 Manufacture of wood except furniture 0 67 Activities auxiliary to ﬁnancial services 0
21 Manufacture of paper and paper products 1 70 Real estate activities 1
22 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 1 71 Rental and leasing activities 0
23 Manufacture of coke and reﬁned petroleum
products
0 72 Data processing and data warehouse 0
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical prod-
ucts
1 73 Scientiﬁc research and development 0
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 1 74 Oce administrative and other business sup-
port activities
0
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral
products
0 75 Public administration and defence; compulsory
social security
1
27 Manufacture of basic metals 1 80 Education 0
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, ex-
cept machinery
1 85 Human health activities 0





1 91 Activities of membership organisations 1
31 Manufacture of electrical equipment 1 92 Culture, sports, and entertainment 1
32 Radio, TV, and telecommunications 1 93 Other services 1
33 Manufacture of machineryand equipment 1 95 Sewerage 0
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and
semi-trailers
1 96 Industry - not assigned 1
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 0 97 Handcraft - not assigned 0
36 Manufacture of furniture 1 98 Services - not assigned 1
37 Repairandinstallationofmachineryandequip-
ment
1 99 Activities of extraterritorial organisations and
bodies
0
40 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning sup-
ply
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